EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
In the slipstream of European Union policies, the Dutch government is in the middle of deregulating and re-regulating the energy market. In the gas industry, the Dutch case is special, since the Netherlands are one of Europe's main gas producers. As a consequence, the Dutch state is heavily involved in the gas business. Currently, they are the full owner of the high and mid-pressure gas transport (henceforth referred to as transport, for short) 1 enterprise -Gas Transport Services, or GTS -and the 50 per cent owner of the largest shipper and trader. Ownership of the latter -Gasunie Trade & Supply, or GUTS -is shared with Shell / Koninklijke Olie (25 %) and ExxonMobil (25 %). 2 Moreover, an array of specific regulations (in, e.g., the area of taxes 3 ) were and still are in place. In the context of the current analysis, we largely abstract from the latter. That is, we focus on the broader issues, ignoring many nitty-gritty details that -if included -would not affect the main conclusions of the analysis presented below. However, after introducing and discussing the heart of this report -a simulation model and four scenario analyses -we will briefly reflect upon the likely bias introduced by our key abstractions in a separate intermezzo before turning to the appraisal.
The deregulation of the gas market is inextricably bound up with re-regulation. In the Netherlands, the DTe has been established as the energy market's regulator. 4 One of its tasks is, so to speak, to set prices for gas transport and distribution (from high to low-pressure services). Indeed, in recent years the DTe has introduces a series of price reductions, which ha ve cumulated to about 34 per cent (in real terms) since DTe's involvement in the gas transport business.
In this report, we analyze how such a price reduction affects the allocation of welfare. Our methodology is scenario analysis.
1 Low-pressure gas transport services are provided by, basically, a series of local monopolies, or socalled regional network operators, that connect end-users with the country's gas "highway", which is operated for approximately 99 per cent by GTS. To complicate matters further, many regional network operators are active as a shipper and trader as well (e.g., Essent and Nuon). This report focuses on the "highway" only, as will be explained in greater detail below. 2 Until recently, both enterprises were unified under the Gasunie roof, with an ownership arrangement similar to Gasunie Trade & Supply's. 3 Taxes introduce much complexity without changing the qualitative outcomes of our analyses (cf. the intermezzo). Indeed, gas-related taxes are very complicated, as is clear from the way gas producers are treated in the context of the so-called MOR (acronym for "MeerOpbrengstRegeling"). 4 For the sake of brevity, we will not engage in the huge discussion about the pros and cons of deregulation and re-regulation in the energy and gas industries. For a critical overview, please consult MacAvoy (2000) .
Building upon a simulation model, applying economics' theory of competition, we calculate the rent distribution after a one-shot price reduction of five per cent for four different scenarios. Below, we will first provide the background information that we used to inform our model building exercise. After that, we will introduce our scenario analysis. Subsequently, as promised above, we will reflect briefly upon the implications of our main abstractions in an intermezzo, partly by running sensitivity analyses. Finally, we will conc lude with an appraisal, in which we will discuss the outcomes of our simulation scenario analyses.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
For the development of a plausible simulation model of the Dutch gas transport market, we need basically two types of information. 5 The first piece of essential information relates to the role of different parties, or players, in the gas chain. In Appendix I, this information is provided from "put to pit". As is clear from this diagram, all gas must be transported through GTS' system, which is organized in a market with 50 so-called shippers. This report focuses on this shipping market. In Appendix II, Appendix I's diagram of the Dutch gas chain is summarized by distinguishing five key gas flows, defined by the location of the gas's entry and exit points:
1. Flow I is import, where gas produced abroad is brought into the Dutch system, and ultimately delivered to a Dutch client.
2. Flow II relates to export, where Dutch gas is transferred from the Netherlands to a foreign destination.
3. Flow III involves transit, where gas is imported into and exported out of the Netherlands without any domestic 'leakage'.
4. Flow IV deals with domestic production and supply, where gas is distributed within the Netherlands from a supplier to a buyer.
5. Flow V has to do with a 'virtual hub' (TTF), where gas is traded but not really transported.
In practice, the Dutch gas transport system is much more complicated, as is clear from the diagram in Appendix I. Here, two complications are worth mentioning. Firstly, as hinted at above, all transport of gas from entry point i to exit point j is done by socalled shippers. Shipper a buys gas transport capacity from GTS, 6 and subsequently ships gas from entry point i to exit point j to serve a client b. From the perspective of the current analysis, we need to distinguish domestic from foreign shippers, and domestic from foreign clients. At the supply side, we initially ignore upstream producers, starting our analysis with the government's gas transport enterprise GTS. Approximately one per cent of the Dutch gas transport capacity is not in the hands of GTS -i.e., the Zebra-pipeline in the Noord-Brabant province. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore this small player, and model GTS as the country's gas transport (public) monopolist. 7 Note that many regional network operators, which serve the end-users after receiving gas from GTS through their final pipeline tracks of the network, are government-owned (though not by the national government, but rather by provinces and municipalities).
8 To be precise, we work with estimates that reflect the current state of the art whilst taking notice of key trends. For example, data about 2005's capacity of the gas transport network are combined with an estimate of GUTS' market share for the near future. Note that, for the sake of confidentiality, Appendix III only reports qualitative information. For our simulation exercises, we could make use of the underlying quantitative information. 9 Export's market share in volumes (iii) is different from its share in €-terms because capacities (iv) rather than volumes are traded in the gas transport market. 10 This percentage is calculated on the basis of a complete list of the 50 shippers currently active in the Netherlands. For the sake of confidentiality, this list is not appended to this report. Note that a large chunk of foreign ownership is the result of ExxonMobil's 25 per cent share in GUTS, which is market that is not served by Gasunie Trade & Supply. In the intermezzo, we will check whether or not the outcomes of our scenario analysis are robust for changes in a number of our key abstractions and assumptions as to ownership shares and tax policies.
SCENARIO ANALYSIS
In our analysis of the likely welfare effects of the distribution of a five per cent reduction in transport costs for natural gas, we will distinguish five main players, assumed, in this study, to control 80 per cent of the Dutch shipping market. Moreover, the government's 50 per cent ownership stake is excluded from this calculation (hence the "commercial" adjective), because we record the government's rent separately (see below). Note that, to be on the safe side, we decided to work with a conservative estimate of foreign ownership. We will deal with this issue in greater detail in the intermezzo as well. 11 These three groups of players are a 'fixed' component in the current analysis, as neither of them is assumed to be able to benefit from the allocation of the € 60 million after the five per cent transport price reduction. We will briefly return to this issue in the intermezzo. 12 Welfare analyses can be very complicated (Baumol, 1986) . Take the following pair of essential examples. First, a general equilibrium analysis would take account of the impact of changes in the gas transport market for all other markets in the economy. Our analysis is a partial equilibrium one: we restrict the argument to the gas transport market only. Second, the effect of a rent increment for player i is not necessarily welfare equivalent to such an increment for player j. We assume no such weight differences. Whoever loses or wins an extra € is not relevant in our argument: the welfare effect of this € is assumed to be equal for all parties, government, shipper and end-user alike. 13 In effect, it is the Dutch Ministry of Finance that operates as GTS's and the Ministry of Economic Affairs as GUTS' shareholder.
At the shipper side, we distinguish foreign from domestic shippers, where we have labeled Shell / Koninklijke Olie's share in the largest shipper (Gasunie Trade & Supply) as a domestic shipper share and ExxonMobil's as a foreign share, for the sake of simplicity. 14 As will become evident below, our analysis takes the large difference in size of the individual shippers into cons ideration, given Gasunie Trade & Supply's dominant position with an 80 per cent market share, although our discussion will focus on the net effects for the five individual groups of agents identified above.
Finally, we assume product homogeneity (that is, "gas is gas"), implying that endconsumers only compare offers of shipper i vis-à-vis shipper j along the price dimension. In this context, we start from the benchmark case of zero switching costs:
that is, each and every end-consumer is willing switch from shipper i to j even in response to infinitesmall price differences. With this set of assumptions, we maximize the potential threat of competition (see the intermezzo for a discussion), ceteris paribus.
Our first two scenarios, A and B, simply assume that players behave either completely egoistically (A) or completely altruistically (B). We start our discussion regarding the distribution of the five per cent transport cost reduction with the most simple case, referred to as Scenario A or the Perfect Collusion Case. That is, we assume that shippers will not pass on any rent to their clients -in our abstraction, end-consumers.
Additionally, we make a number of simplifying auxilliary assumptions, which will be discussed below. Suppose, then, (a) that the transport costs are the only relevant variable costs for each individual shipper, (b) that none of the individual shippers will adjust the price charged to the end-consumer, and (c) that there is perfect collusion among the shippers such that none of them changes the quantity supplied. Under those conditions, Table 1 depicts the distribution of benefits. Recall that about 40 per cent of the commercial (i.e., excluding the 50 per cent ownership share of the government but including the 25 % share of ExxonMobil in GUTS) shippers is foreign-owned, and that one third of the end-consumers' rent -if any -is passed along to foreign endusers.
14 Strictly speaking, matters are much more complicated. For instance, Shell / Koninklijke Olie is formally 60 per cent Dutch and 40 per cent British. Including such subtleties would complicate our analyses substantially, without a significant impact upon our main results. For the current purposes, we decided to apply the KISS-principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid). Note that this implies that our 'leakage' results are downward-biased because a substantial portion of Shell / Koninklijke Olie's profits flows to foreign owners.
Obviously, the DTe would like the transport cost reduction to lower prices for the final consumers and, ideally, increase competition in the shipping market. Scenario B, also summarized in Table 1 , focuses on this Perfect Competition Case, as it presumes that the entire reduction in gas transport costs is passed on to the end-consumers, under the assumption that there is no change in quantity demanded and no change in the distribution of production across shippers. That is, the demand side's price elasticity is taken to be zero 15 and the shippers' market shares are assumed to be constant. Scenarios A and B present simple benchmark cases, but hardly take the competitive structure of the market into consideration. After all, the behavior of shippers was exogenously assumed to reflect either of both corner cases -i.e., perfect egoism or ditto altruism (cases A and B, respectively). There is, in fact, one dominant shipper in this market (Gasunie Trade & Supply, with an assumed marklet share of 80 per cent), though, accompanied by a few mid-sized and small companies (about 50 shippers altogether). The literature has extensively analyzed such dominant-firm markets, where the non-dominant firms -in our case, shippers -are referred to as the competitive fringe. The other scenarios we investigate are based on this dual market structure literature (cf. Tirole, 1988; van Witteloostuijn & Boone, 2005) . 16 Now, that is, we will endogenously derive the actual behavior of the competitive fringe (Scenario C), or of the competitive fringe and GUTS in interaction (Scenario D). In so doing, we apply a modern theory of competition -i.e., a dual market with a dominant center and a competitive periphery -to the Dutch gas transport market that nicely fits with the latter's key features.
We assume the cost structure for the fringe shippers 50 ,..., 2 = i to be equal to
Here F i indicate fixed costs, and ) 1 ( 
The total share of the 45 smallest shippers is about five per cent of the market. So, we denote their relative sales by 9 / 1 45 / 5 = = x per cent for each small shipper. We measure the efficiency of all shippers relative to these smaller shippers, which gives:
17 Thus, the efficiency of fringe shippers increases the larger their sales volume, which reflects a standard scale economies assumption. As a consequence, their market shares can only increase due to relative efficiency gains. Below, we will develop two plausible scenarios that illustrate how, in practice, the actual outcomes of the rent distribution game will depend upon the underlying features of rivalry: in Scenario C, we assume that the 16 Technically, this literature applies so-called game theory (see, e.g., Rasmusen, 1990; van Witteloostuijn, 2003) . Game theory is the modern core of the economics of competition, or industrial organization. In this report, we will simply introduce the basic equations needed to understand this report's simulation model, ignoring the underlying game-theoretic details. behavior at all; in Scenario D, conversely, we will assume that it does react by lowering price.
First, in Scenario C, we calculate the fixed costs of the fringe shippers on the basis of the initial assumption that none of the shipping firms earns positive profits (fixed-cost investments are thus a means to reduce variable costs). Hence, the model includes a trade-off: lower marginal costs are associated with larger fixed costs. Initially, for the sake of normalization, fixed costs are thus determined by the zero-profit condition.
That is, the gas transport market is assumed to be in a zero-profit equilibrium just 
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Under the assumption that the dominant Gasunie Trade & Supply shipper does not change the price for the end-consumers -i.e., the dominant shipper decides not to respond to the moves of its smaller rivals -, this implies that the fringe shippers will increase their sales at the expense of the market share of the dominant shipper by lowering their price. As a result, at a given price reduction, the smaller shippers will increase their market share at the expense of the dominant shipper (recall that total demand is assumed to remain unchanged). If there is (i) no change in the price charged to the final consumer by GUTS and (ii) no entry of new fringe shippers, we 18 So, from Scenario C to D, we move more closely into the direction of the 'competitive' outcome that the government is seeking to bring about by deregulating the market. In both scenarios, we assume that competition comes from smaller and more flexible shippers that will attack the former monopolist's (i.e., Gasunie Trade & Supply's) dominant position. In Scenario C, competition only goes 'halfway', because price competition fails to materialize as Gasunie Trade & Supply does not respond to rivalry from the smaller shippers by reducing its price. In Scenario D, competition is fully brought to the fore, since then the dominant Gasunie Trade & Supply shipper plays the rivalry game by reducing its price.
estimate the loss in market share by the dominant shipper to be 1.3 percentage points.
The distribution of benefits in this Dominance Erosion Case is summarized in Table   2 . The outcomes with a zero rent allocation to end-consumers and a 1.3 percentage point GUTS market share erosion only might, at first sight, be surprising. To understand this, we need to provide an intuition of the dynamics associated with the underlying competitive game. We do this in two steps. First, price competion is such that, given our assumption of behavioral asymmetry (i.e., GUTS is passive), the competitive fringe can maximize profit by launching an infinitesmall price cut. Suppose that GUTS' price is p. Then, under the assumption of zero switching cost at the demand side of the market, offering a p-e with e ? 0 to end-consumers is enough to attract the number of new clients needed to maximize profit. Second, as far as this profitmaximizing market share expansion is concerned, the competitive fringe faces the fixed cost -marginal cost tradeoff explained above, implying the danger of growing too large, given the nature of the fringe's cost function. As a result, the competitive fringe will limit the market share increase to the profit-maximizing optimum, which turns out to be 1.3 percentage points.
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As explained above, it is likely that the reduction of transport costs makes it attractive for the smaller and more flexible shippers to increase their market share at the expense of the dominant shipping firm's market position by lowering their price. This effect may be exacerbated if there is entry of new shippers into the market. It is, however, unlikely that the dominant shipper will not respond to its loss in market share. Instead, if the price charged to the final consumer is lowered by GUTS, the dominant shipper can prevent its market share from eroding. Scenario D, therefore, assumes that GUTS lowers the price charged to the final consumer to such an extent that the market share of this dominant shipper remains at 80 per cent. We estimate that this implies that about 2.6 percentage points of the five per cent reduction in transport costs is passed on to the consumer (which is 52 per cent of the total reduction). 20 There is, in this Retaliation Response Case, a slight redistribution of market share among the fringe shippers, where the smallest ones will expand at the expense of their mid-sized counterparts.
INTERMEZZO
For sure, the above analyses are developed after introducing a series of abstractions and assumptions. On the one hand, this might imply that the above outcomes reflect a conservative estimation of the importance of rent 'leakages' -i.e., an underestimation of the relative size of the rents not allocated to the (Dutch) consumers. This can be illustrated by briefly discussing four of such key 'conservative' abstractions or assumptions:
1. Implicitly, our conception of competition assumes the threat implied by low switching costs for end-consumers. That is, end-consumers are assumed to switch from shipper i to j if the latter is only marginally cheaper. This is what drives competition, and what puts pressure on the dominant shipper's position.
However, evidence suggests that many end-consumers are reluctant to switch, for whatever reason, hence failing to respond to price differences.
2. We abstracted from a number of other parties that are involved in the gas delivery chain. For example, upstream producers and downstream traders are not part of our model. It might be, though, that in the vertical bargaining game within the industry chain such parties are able to reap part of the rents by negotiating higher (producers) or lower (traders) prices, and hence higher margins at the expense of end-users.
3. We ignored the potential increase of the demand for transit transport in response to lower prices in the Netherlands vis-à-vis foreign (particularly German) pipelines. Such a substitution effect -from 'domestic' to transit transport -would imply that even more rents are passed on to foreign endconsumers. 4. In deciding on the share of foreign ownership in the shipping market, we opted for a conservative assumption. For one, we did we take Shell / Koninklijke
Olie's 25 per cent share in GUTS to be fully Dutch. Additionally, we assumed that only 40 per cent of the fringe shippers were foreign. In practice, though, the foreign share is larger -and hence is the 'leak' to shareholders abroad.
On the other hand, though, at least two abstractions imply that the outcomes of our scenario analyses are upward biased (in the sense of overestimating 'leakages'): (1) the government can skim part of the shippers' rents through corporate taxes; and (2) with competition, the hope is that X-inefficiencies will be reduced. As a sensitivity check, we therefore recalculated our two 'passive' scenarios (A and B) after taking notice of, especially, the role of taxes (potentially reducing the upward bias) and traders (potentially decreasing the downward bias).
Basically, we took the model underlying Scenarios A and B, and changed the analyses in two ways. First, we added (corporate) taxes and (mid-stream) traders, as indicated above. Second, we ran a series of sensitivity analyses by subsequently manipulating three key parameters: (i) the percentage of the cost reduction passed on to the next party in the gas chain by shippers and traders; (ii) the percentage of foreign ownership in the shipping market; and three (iii) complete privatization of GUTS. We added cases where only five percent of GUTS' rents were transferred abroad (correcting for a potential upward bias, given the dampening effect of the special tax arrangement 21 Another issue relates to the impact of a binding transport capacity. If GTS's capacity is potentially binding (e.g., in years in which Jack Frost rules), the reliability of domestic delivery will be harmed if transit flows increase at the expense of domestic ones.
that applies to GUTS), we introduced scenarios in which the foreign ownership share in the fringe of the shipping market is assumed to be 75 per cent (correcting for a potential downward bias, given the observation that foreign ownership is probably far above the 40 per cent assumed in Scenarios A to D), and we assumed that GUTS is privatized such that ExxonMobil and Shell / Koninklijke Olie fully share ownership in a 50 -50 per cent arrangement (simulating a completely privatized shipper market).
An example of a sensitivity analysis is included in Appendix IV. There, key parameters are explained, and the structure of the model is defined.
The outcomes of all sensitivity analyses are reported in Appendix V. Note that we though now exogenously assuming the shippers' (and traders') behavior rather than endogenously deriving their profit-maximizing strategies (as we did above). Here, it suffices to observe that the above outcomes are indeed robust. Adding such complications and manipulations does not affect the qualitative pattern as to the effect of a five per cent price reduction on the rent distribution as reported in Table 1 above.
CONCLUSION
Keeping the intermezzo's remarks in mind, we can interpret our results as follows. As part of the larger energy market deregulation program, the DTe has developed the habit to force the Dutch near-monopoly gas transport enterprise -GTS -to lower its prices. The key argument is that lower gas transport prices will benefit the end-user.
Indeed, that might well be the case. However, at least three observations complicate matters substantially, as we illustrated above:
1. Observation 1: government ownership. GTS is government-owned, and the dominant shipper -Gasunie Trade & Supply -is partly so (50 %). Hence, lost revenues from the gas transport business will all emerge at the debit side of the government's budget, and part of the shippers' rent returns in the government's pockets.
2. Observation 2: imperfect competition. Firms enter into the competitive game to make profits. Shippers are not different. So, apart from in the extreme cases of perfect competition (or, more generally, perfect contestability: cf. Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1982) , part of the rents will end up in the pockets of the shippers, rather than the end-consumers.
3. Observation 3: rent export. The Netherlands are not an isolated island in the European gas ocean. Not only is the majority of gas transported in the Netherlands exported to foreign end-users, but apart from that ha ve foreign owners a large stake in Dutch shippers. As a result, given the fact that the Dutch industry is not autarktic, part of the rents will always be distributed, or will always 'leak' away, to foreign consumers and shippers (or their shareholders).
These three observations together have three important implications. First, state ownership implies that much rent allocation is simply a matter of circulating money from one government sub-budget to the other (Observation 1). Second, given that the industry is imperfectly competitive, part of the rents will not be passed on to the endconsumers (Observation 2). Third, it is unavoidable that a substantial part of the rents are transferred abroad (Observation 3).
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In Table 3 , we summarize the rent distribut ion results of our four scenario analyses, including the percentage of rents not received by Dutch end-consumers. 23 Clearly, it is very likely that large percentages of the redistributed rents end up in the hands of the 22 Strictly speaking, the third implication may not be an issue, as the government's aim might be to allocate rents to end-consumers irrespective of where they live. Why would a, say, € 100 gas bill reduction be worth more for a Dutch end-consumer than for her or his companion in Germany, Greece, Russia or anywhere else? In effect, given economics' law of decreasing marginal utility, this € 100 gas bill reduction may be more important for end-consumers in countries poorer than the Netherlands. However, in practice, this Utopian world view is not really dominant, to put it mildly. 23 Because our sensitivity analyses produced outcomes very similar the Scenarios A and B, we decided not to report them in Table 3 , for the sake of brevity. Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Only input data which are not in bold in attachment 4 have been varied in the above scheme *) Privatization GUTS means GUTS will solely be owned by Shell and ExxonMobil **) Shell to be assumed either 100% Dutch or 60% Dutch and 40% foreign (UK), which makes GUTS 35% foreign when adding the 25% share of ExxonMobil
